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Abstract. Despite increasing discussions concerning the recently published wing spar airworthiness directive (AD) that af-
fects many training aircraft and several current ADs for wing struts, there remains limited objective literature on incidents 
of wing separation or mid-air breakup. This paper attempts to report and analyse instances of wing separation and mid-air 
breakup of light training aircraft. A careful review of the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aircraft 
accident database revealed that wing separations were more likely occur as mid-air breakup in PA28s than 172s/182s (OR: 
3.06, 95 % CI: 1.3682 to 6.8536, p = .008). Additionally, wing separations were less likely to occur as mid-air breakups in 
the strutted 172s/182s than 177s/210s that don’t have a wing strut (OR: 0.11, 95 % CI: 0.04 to 0.29, p = <.001). This implies 
that non-strutted wing designs may be more susceptability to mid-air breakup than the strutted design of similar aircraft.
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Introduction
With the publication of several recent airworthiness di-
rectives (ADs), a lot of attention has been drawn to the 
wing spar of the Piper PA-28 platform (PA28) (Sciortino, 
2021). PA28 collectively includes the “Cherokee”, “Warri-
or”, “Archer”, and “Arrow” models (among others) many of 
which are common single engine piston training aircraft. 
The 2018 tragedy in the Piper Arrow (PA28R) that expe-
rienced sudden departure of the left wing at 900’ resulting 
in two fatalities was underscored by the fact that it was 
a seemingly “random” accident. The aircraft was main-
tained to standards by a reputable flight school, operated 
in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) within limita-
tions, and during a normal phase of flight. In this way 
it differed from many other accidents that may involve 
unexpected encounter with weather, unauthorized aero-
batic maneuvering, or involvement of drugs or alcohol. 
Accidents like this may feel uncomfortable as they seem 
unavoidable. There is of course always a reason behind an 
accident. In this case, the cause was wing spar fatigue in 
an area that is not easily accessible for visual evaluation 
on annual or 100 hour inspections (National Transporta-
tion Safety Board, 2018). The AD in response to this ac-
cident requires examination for metal fatigue cracking in 
the lower wing spar cap by instillation of new inspection 
panels (Sciortino, 2021). The PA28 platform is not alone 
though in the discussion of wing attachment related air-
worthiness directives. An AD was recently issued affecting 
thousands of Cessna aircraft that addressed wing strut at-
tachment to the fuselage (Gant, 2020a). This too affected 
many training and common general aviation (GA) aircraft 
including the Cessna 172 Skyhawk (C172) and Cessna 
182 Skylane (C182), also single engine piston aircraft. 
This AD specifically addressed the fatigue near the wing 
strut of the aircraft which is a structure extending from 
fuselage to wing. This braced vs. cantilever (non-strutted) 
design of the PA28 line provides additional integrity to the 
wing attachment. Cessna does offer cantilever high wings 
in a similar design to the strutted versions including the 
Cessna 177 Cardinal (C177) and Cessna 210 Centurion 
(C210). Interestingly, these aircraft have also been the 
center of concern regarding wing spar integrity after mid-
air breakup of a C210 due to metal fatigue for which the 
FAA released a mandatory visual and eddy current inspec-
tion of the wing spars on these models, reminiscent of the 
current AD (Gant, 2020b).
Among the top 10 causes of GA accidents, “System 
Component Failure – Non-Powerplant” (the category un-
der which structural failures would fall) ranks #6 in fre-
quency for cause of accidents according to the FAA (Dorr, 
2018). The current data supports a modest improvement 
in GA safety over the past few decades and while new 
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technology may be improving situation awareness and 
overall safety, the high price of these more advanced air-
craft means that old airframes (prone to metal fatigue from 
decades of flight) are likely to remain in the sky for years to 
come (Boyd, 2017). While the Ballistic Parachute Recovery 
System (BPRS), made popular by Cirrus, has demonstrated 
effectiveness in reducing fatality after a wide variety of ac-
cident conditions but these systems are expensive to main-
tain and expensive to retrofit in older aircraft (Alaziz et al., 
2017). These aging training aircraft are currently operated 
past the service life for which they were originally designed 
so there is an inherent concern for structural integrity (Jaya 
et al., 2010). Due to this, it’s reasonable to expect more of 
these ADs focused on fatiguing metal to spring up in the 
future and data on accidents in the common training air-
craft is important to help assess the appropriateness of the 
ADs and safety of the aircraft in general. The high rate of 
GA accidents compared to that of airlines is a discrepancy 
that has existed for many years and studies and interven-
tions directed at reducing the rate should be a priority (Li 
& Baker, 2007). While it has been reported that accidents 
involving operations outside of weight and balance limita-
tions have remained static for some time, there is no data 
investigating structural failures occurring while complying 
with aircraft limitations (Boyd, 2016). A review of existing 
literature also fails to produce any work that specifically 
evaluates the numbers of wing separation events like those 
that prompted the aforementioned ADs.
Analysis of the numbers is valuable as it would provide 
data from which individuals and regulating bodies may 
inform conclusions about the appropriateness of the ADs 
or general safety of the strutted vs. cantilever design.
The aim of this report was to investigate how many 
times a wing separated (especially in an “unexpected” 
fashion) for the common trainers mentioned above and 
if there were any differences between the low, cantilever 
wing and high, strutted wing design. The cantilever coun-
terparts to the common Cessna trainers were also evalu-
ated to determine if any difference in wing separation 
frequency exists between similar air frames based on the 
presence of a strut.
1. Methods
Author MH performed a search of the United States Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aircraft ac-
cident records (National Transportation Safety Board, 
2001). The NTSB aircraft accident database contains re-
cords of civil accidents and incidents involving aircraft in 
the United States, its territories, and international waters 
from 1962 to present. This search was done before the 
CAROL system (Case Analysis and Reporting OnLine) 
was implemented on 11/03/2020 for records 2008 and lat-
er (National Transportation Safety Board, 2020). A similar 
search that includes 2008 and later can still be performed 
using the aviation database and will yield all the public 
records from which this data was derived (Aviation Da-
tabase, 2001).
The thorough search was done for the PA28, C172, 
C182, C177, and C210 models using Piper or Cessna for 
make as appropriate. The following terms were used for 







The PDFs for the individual accident reports were 
viewed on the NTSB website and the following variables 
were collected based on careful review of the accident re-
port text and recorded in Microsoft Excel:
1. Model (PA28, C172, C182, C177, or C210).
2. In-Air Wing Separation vs. Post-Collision Separa-
tion.
3. Engine Loss Implicated as Cause of Accident or not.
4. Weather Implicated as Cause of Accident or not.
5. Drugs Implicated as Cause of Accident or not.
6. The Accident Resulted in No or Any Fatalities.
7. If the Wing Separation was “Insidious” or not De-
fined as Wing Separations Occurring:
a) in aircraft maintained to standard,
b) within operating limitations,
c) during a normal phase of flight,
d) in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).
These variables were chosen as they represent some of 
the broad categories by which the NTSB groups probable 
cause of aircraft accident. Several causes may contribute 
to an accident and some categories are very broad (e.g. 
engine loss may itself be due to several underlying caus-
es such as mechanical problems or fuel starvation). Any 
duplicate data was eliminated. As mentioned above, the 
PA28 model line includes the Cherokee, Warrior, Archer, 
and Arrow models (among others) including their vari-
ations (e.g. PA28-180 Archer and PA28-181 Archer III). 
Many of these are common training aircraft. For a com-
parison, data for the C172 and C182 were included since 
they are also common training aircraft and reasonable 
counterparts in terms of horsepower and complexity to 
many variants of the PA28 platform. The C177 and C210 
were included due to their cantilever wing so analysis 
could be conducted between two differing Cessna wing 
configurations on a similar airframe.
Wing separation is likely in a wide variety of circum-
stances. The search by text string in the accident report 
narrative included records of aircraft that lost a wing for 
any reason including due to striking the ground at the 
final crash site as well as accidents on the taxiway. Data 
on mid-air vs post-collision breakups was specifically col-
lected to differentiate them from the wing departing due 
to colliding with an object (e.g. trees, power lines, etc.), or 
the terrain on final impact.
Statistical analysis was performed in SPSS v24 and in-
cluded chi-square analysis with calculation of Odds Ratios.
The method of this study has several limitations. There 
is limited standardization by the NTSB with changes in 
280 M. Hirabayashi. Analysis of wing separation and mid-air breakup in light training aircraft
reporting format over time and the limitation of the data 
beginning in 1962. Additionally, cases may be missing but 
the search terms returned a large number of records from 
the NTSB Aircraft Accident Database that were all manu-
ally reviewed for appropriate inclusion. The NTSB also has 
a limited scope to the United States, its territories, and in-
ternational waters. Accidents outside of the scope are not 
included in the analysis and there may be different practices 
in terms of maintenance and different accident patterns in 
other countries. Lastly, a great number of aircraft models are 
not included in this analysis such as smaller training plat-
forms including the Cessna 150 or Piper PA38 Tomahawk.
2. Discussion on results
2.1. Consideration of PA28 accidents
In all 114 cases of a wing departing or in-flight breakup of 
a PA28 there were two instances of insidious wing separa-
tion. The first was in 1987 when a PA28-181 was performing 
survey work for a pipe company (National Transportation 
Safety Board, 1987). During normal cruise flight in VMC, 
the left wing departed. Analysis after the accident showed 
fatigue on the wing spar to be the underlying reason. A 
10-inch-long crack that had been stop-drilled in the upper 
wing skin was also found. There were 7490 hours on the 
airframe. In response, the FAA issued AD 87-08-08 that re-
quired the replacement of any wing spars found to be cracked 
as well as the visual inspection of the upper wing skins for 
cracks. In May 1989, the FAA issued AD 87-08-08R3 which 
rescinded the original AD and its revisions (Perry, 1989).
The second instance of insidious wing separation is the 
case referenced in the introduction. In 2018, A PA28R de-
parted from a touch and go when the left wing separated. 
Again, wing spar fatigue was the underlying cause and there 
were 7,690.6 airframe hours and 33,276 landing cycles (Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board, 2018). This flight was 
also in a well-maintained aircraft, in VMC, under normal 
operating conditions, during a normal phase of flight.
In the PA28 platform, 39 (34.2%) of the wing sepa-
rations were mid-air breakups, they occurred before the 
aircraft or wing collided with an object or terrain. Other 
than the 2 insidious wing separations, the remaining mid-
air breakups were determined to be due to exceeding the 
operating limitations of the aircraft (due to loss of control, 
unsafe maneuvering, etc.) or a mid-air collision.
2.2. Consideration of C172 accidents
In the 42 wing separations/breakups in the C172, there were 
no cases of a wing departing an insidious manner. Worth 
mentioning, a wing did separate from a 172 during a normal 
phase of flight within operating limitations on 11/29/2002 
and this was due to a missing nut that secures the right 
wing’s strut to the fuselage (National Transportation Safety 
Board, 2002). This is perhaps equally concerning as it rep-
resents and aircraft that received a recent annual and was 
reasonably believed to be airworthy but was indeed a result 
of a maintenance error.
In the remaining C172 accidents evaluated, 6 (14.3%) 
of the wing separations were mid-air breakups, they oc-
curred before the aircraft or wing collided with an object 
or terrain. The mid-air breakups were determined to be 
due to exceeding the operating limitations of the aircraft 
(due to loss of control, unsafe maneuvering, etc.) or a mid-
air collision.
2.3. Consideration of C128 accidents
In the 20 reviewed wing separations/breakups of a C182, 
there were no insidious cases. Worth noting, 15 (75.0%) of 
wing separation were due to colliding with trees or elevated 
terrain and 10 (50.0%) involved an encounter with weather.
In the remaining C182 accidents evaluated, 2 (10.0%) of 
the wing separations were mid-air breakups, they occurred 
before the aircraft or wing struck an object or terrain. Worth 
specifically mentioning due to the oddity of the scenario, one 
of the wing separation occurred after a C182 collided with 
another aircraft during a skydiving operation and since all 
involved were wearing personal parachutes there were no fa-
talities (National Transportation Safety Board, 2013). The 
other was loss of control and subsequent maneuvering out-
side of the aircraft’s limitations.
2.4. Consideration of C177 accidents
In the C177, there were 4 wing separations/breakups in the 
NTSB database. These were mostly collisions. Only one of 
them was a mid-air breakup from exceeding airspeed limi-
tations. None of the wing separations were insidious.
2.5. Consideration of C210 accidents
In the 27 cases evaluated in the C210, there was a single 
case of an insidious mid-air breakup for an unknown rea-
son. In 1/21/97, 12 feet of the right wing departed and the 
cause was not definitively established (National Transpor-
tation Safety Board, 1997). The report does include that 
“Examination of the airframe, engine, and components 
failed to reveal preexistent anomalies”. It’s possible turbu-
lence or ice was a factor but there is no mention of specific 
fatigue as in the PA28 reports.
In the remaining C210 accidents evaluated, 18 (66.7%) of 
the wing separations were mid-air breakups, they occurred 
before the aircraft or wing struck an object or terrain. The 
mid-air breakups were determined to be due to exceeding 
the operating limitations of the aircraft (due to loss of con-
trol, unsafe maneuvering, etc.) or a mid-air collision.
2.6. Comparison analysis
Some select comparisons were performed. In cases of wing 
separation, it was evaluated if there was a relationship be-
tween aircraft type and if the aircraft experienced a mid-air 
breakup (e.g. after loss of control, turbulence etc.) or the 
wing separated after striking an object (e.g. trees, towers 
etc.) or terrain (i.e. final crash site on the ground). PA28s 
were compared to C172s/C182s because again, they are in 
many respects comparable platforms, common trainers, 
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and collectively represent similar levels of complexity. Mid-
air breakups accounted for 39 (34.2%) of the wing separa-
tions in PA28s and 9 (14.5%) of C172s/C182s (Table 1). 
This was a statistically significant difference (OR: 3.06, 
95 % CI: 1.3682 to 6.8536, p = .008). Based on these data, 
in cases of wing separation a PA28 was roughly 3 times 
more likely to have that separation associated with a mid-
air breakup compared to a C172/C182.
Table 1. Mid-air breakups vs. post-collision wing separations 
between PA28s and C172s/C182s




The same scenario was also evaluated between C172s/
C182s and C177s/C210s as a matter of interest between 
the strutted vs. cantilever design.
Mid-air breakups accounted for 9 (14.5%) of C172s/
C182s and 19 (61.3%) of the wing separations in C177s/
C210s (Table 2). This was a statistically significant difference 
(OR: 0.11, 95 % CI: 0.04 to 0.29, p = <.001). Based on these 
data, in cases of wing separation a C177/C210 was roughly 
10 times as likely to have that separation associated with an 
in-flight, mid-air breakup compared to a C172/C182.
Table 2. Mid-air breakups vs. post-collision wing separations 
between C172s/C182s and C1772/C210s




This is presented in Figure 1 and conditions associated 
with wing separations in various platforms are displayed 
in Figure 2 (C177 is excluded due to low sample size). The 
reason percentages do not add up to 100% is because the 
NTSB reports often include multiple factors contributing 
to the accident so each factor was included if it was impli-
cated in the final NTSB accident report.
Conclusions
This study is the first to evaluate objective data on wing sepa-
rations/mid-air breakups of common training aircraft based 
on United States NTSB archive and can provide objective 
evidence to pilots, manufacturers, and governing authorities 
on the frequency and circumstances surrounding wing sepa-
ration events. Hazard Identification & Risk Mitigation is a 
valuable retrospective tool while providing data with which 
prediction can be drawn to avoid further accidents. Two 
instances of a well-maintained PA28 aircraft maneuvering 
within operating limitations during a normal phase of flight 
in VMC that experienced wing separation were located in 
the NTSB record. There is also a case of a C172 thought to 
be maintained to standard with a recent annual experiencing 
a similar wing separation due to a maintenance error and a 
case of a C210 experiencing a right wing departure for in-
conclusive reasons. The C172 case particularly underscores 
the importance of reliable maintenance as a missing bolt was 
sufficient to destabilize the structure and result in spontane-
ous wing separation. In the two cases of the PA28s though 
the root cause of the accident was wing spar metal fatigue 
that is not a routine part of maintenance inspections which 
is what the current AD addresses.
The data also suggest that a PA28 is 3 times as likely 
to be associated with a pre-collision, mid-air vs. post-col-
lision wing separation compared to a C172/C182. Addi-
tionally, based on the data a C172/C182 was 1/10 as likely 
to be associated with a mid-air breakup vs. post-collision 
wing separation compared to a C1877/C210. In the strut-
ted wing design it appears that wing separation before 
collision with terrain or other aircraft is less common 
compared to the cantilever design on these small train-
ers which may support the abundance of caution some 
of the ADs provide. This is also evidence that the wing 
strut is valuable additional security in reducing risk of a 
mid-air breakup involving the wing even when the air-
craft is operated outside of operating limitations. Because 
of this, measures that optimize the standard maintenance 
on these aging airframes, especially those with the can-
tilever design, seems appropriate even if they are costly. 
The fleet of trainers will continue to age and metal fa-
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Figure 1. Post-collision vs. mid-air breakups in PA28s, C172/
C182s, and C177s/C210s
Figure 2. Percentage of events contributing to wing separations 
and fatalities in PA28s, C172s, C182s, and C210s
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maintenance procedure to address these symptoms of age 
and use would be prudent.
In addition to the insidious PA28 cases, there were in-
deed cases in the C172 and C210 of a wing separating for 
equally “unexpected” reasons (inadequate maintenance 
and an unknown cause respectively). Updated mainte-
nance to address the needs of an aging fleet must be ac-
companied by reliable maintenance.
Based on the information presented here, it certainly 
seems that remaining within operating limitations and avoid-
ing weather beyond personal or aircraft capabilities is a wise 
decision in any circumstance. Additionally, a wing spar that 
is difficult to assess during regular maintenance might not 
benefit from an AD if there are errors in the maintenance 
itself. Future studies would be helpful to evaluate the root 
cause of some precipitating factors (e.g. loss of control) and 
further analysis on the technology available (e.g. radar, auto-
pilot, etc.) could help evaluate their role in preventing over-
stressing the airframe. Additionally, it would be interesting to 
evaluate the value of the retrofit BPRS in older aircraft.
Regardless, of the hundreds of thousands of these air-
craft that have flown their millions of collective hours, wing 
separation and mid-air breakup is rare. It is certainly impor-
tant to take every personal action possible to minimize this 
risk including ensuring regular maintenance, maneuvering 
within operating limitations, and adhering to personal and 
aircraft weather minimums to make them even rarer.
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